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I. Introduction
In a recent issue of Australian Economic Papers, Luca Lambertini
and Gianpaolo Rossini (henceforth LR) attempt to analyse the strategic
investment behaviour of a labour-managed firm (LMF) in an LM duopoly
and that of an LMF and a profit-maximising firm (PMF) in a mixed
duopoly. Concretely speaking, employing two-stage game models in
which the firms make irrevocable commitments to investment in the first
stage and choose outputs in the second stage, LR consider whether they
overinvest or underinvest in capital. By contrast, in a conventional
context Brander and Spencer (1983), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Bulow
et al. (1985), and Lee (1985) have obtained the conclusion that PMFs
overinvest (underinvest) in research and development (R & D) or
advertising in Cournot (Bertrand) competition when employing it as a
strategic way. Furthermore, Leahy and Neary (1997) and Haruna (1998)
have described that whether or not the PMFs use a larger or smaller
amount of R&D investment than that required to minimise its costs
depends crucially on the rates ofR & D spillovers.
LR assert that results derived in the Cournot LM and mixed
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duopolies are in sharp contrast with the conventional results of, e. g.,
Brander and Spencer (1983). Their analytical intention attracts our
interest, but we have two doubts about it. First, when LR make a
comparative study with the conventional results, why do they employ a
method different from the conventional method like Brander and Spencer
(1983), and Bulow et al. (1985)? Especially, the method used in Section II
of LR is problematic because the condition for cost minimisation for the
LMF does not correctly correspond to that for maximisation of its per-
capita profits: that is, there is no duality between both conditions. To
make matters worse, when their analysis is reexamined along the
conventional method, a serious problem also arises that makes their
outcome of Proposition 1 meaningless: although an interior equilibrium
in the simultaneous game based on their model is indispensable in order
to examine the level of strategic investment, there is not such an equi-
librium. Their model cannot thus provide a suitable criterion to judge
whether the LMF underinvests or overinvests, unlike Brander and
Spencer (1983), so that the discussion of LR does not hold. Secondly, even
if there is an interior equilibrium in that simultaneous game, we have
some doubt whether their results such as Propositions 1 and 2 can be
generalised: namely, even if we take for granted that the analysis of
LMFs always involves difficulties, we feel misgivings about their model,
because it is too simple.
As the first purpose ofthis paper, we indicate an error included in the
LR model, as mentioned above. In addition, it is shown that another
serious problem newly arises even though their analysis is corrected. The
second purpose is to reconsider the relationship between the levels ofR &
D and strategic commitment in both an LM and a mixed duopolies with R
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& D spillovers and to compare with the conclusion derived in the
conventional context, e. g., in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Bulow et al.
(1985), Leahy and Neary (1997), and Haruna (1998) as well as Brander
and Spencer (1983). Among others, Leahy and Neary (1997) and Haruna
(1998) extend the previous discussion to more general one and dem-
onstrate that the levels of R&D in fact rely on the levels of R&D
spillovers.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II we show that there is
no consistency, i. e., duality, in the LR model and prove that their
simultaneous game based on their model has no interior equilibrium. In
Section III we consider the strategic R&D levels of LMFs in an LM
duopoly with spillovers. It will be shown that, like PMFs in the
conventional models, the LMFs have incentives to strategically overinvest
or underinvest according as their outputs are strategic substitutes or
complements. Section IV investigates the strategic investment behaviour
of an LMF and a PMF in a mixed duopoly. When another type of firm is
included in a duopoly, the behaviour of the LMF is influenced by it.
Section V concludes.
II. A Lack of Duality in the Lambertini and Rossini
Model and No Interior Equilibrium
LR point out that LMFs in an LM duopoly and an LMF and a PMF in
a mixed duopoly will either overinvest or underinvest in physical capital
when it is strategically used. Following their notation, 8e; 18k; =
r - q;2Ik/ = 0 is derived as the condition for cost minimisation. They
conclude that the LMF overinvests (underinvests) in capacity k; when the
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derivative of Ci is positive (negative), as expressed in Propositions 1 and
2. However, their conclusions are misleading because the maximisation
problem of per-capita profits Vi as to the LMF does not correctly
correspond to its minimisation one of c,: that is, even if cost mini-
misation is achieved at the level of k/, Vi is not always maximised at k/. 1
Put it in another way, there is no duality between both conditions for
minimisation and maximisation, while in conventional PMF models the
duality rightfully holds. To settle this problem the conventional method
should be adopted, as used in Brander and Spencer (1983), Bulow et al.
(1985), Dixit (1986), Lee (1986), and Leahy and Neary (1997), and,
otherwise, the results obtained under the LM and mixed duopolies may
not be compared with the conventionally established results.
When we adopt that method, in the simultaneous game based on the
LR model the first-order conditions for maximisation of per-capita profits
are given by
8Vi ki [ 2(pqi -. rikJ]~ = 2 a - 2q; - qj - = 0
8qi qi q,
8V pq - 2rk~I = 1 2 '=0,
8ki qi
(1)
(2)
where p = a - qi - qj denotes the inverse demand function. Substituting
1 To verify this, as an example, let us see the conditions for maximisation and
minimisation with respect to ki • They are given, respectively, as
8Vi = pqi - 2rki = 0 and 8Ci = r _ 'fl. = O.
8ki q,' 8ki k,'
Both conditions are not the same in that different levels of investment are obtained
from those.
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conditions (1) into (2) yields 8V,j8q; = - k;q;= O. This demonstrates that
each LMF produces no output. That is, there is no interior equilibrium in
the simultaneous game of the LM duopoly, and the PM duopoly results in
the monopoly ofthe PMF. The optimal (efficient) level of investment, i. e.,
a benchmark for comparison, should be given by that of investment under
the simultaneous equilibrium. In the LR case, since a prerequisite for
their discussion is lost, it is impossible to specify the relationship between
capital commitment and its level. Hence Propositions 1 and 2 of LR are
invalid in that they cannot make a correct comparison between their and
the conventional conclusions.
III. The Effect of Strategic Commitment on the Cournot
Duopoly of Labour-Managed Firms with R&D
Spillovers
In this and the next sections we consider whether the conventional
conclusion as to the strategic use of R&D is extended to both an LM and
a mixed duopolies.
We first take up a two-stage model ofCournot LM duopoly, in which
two firms determine the levels of R&D in the first stage and outputs in
the second stage. After R&D decision the firms are engaged in quantity
competition. On the other hand, R&D investment is made to reduce
production costs before output decision, so it is used for a strategic
objective.' It is assumed that there are R&D spillovers among the firms,
2 In general, in most conventional models a strategic variable is R&D investment, but
in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) advertising is that variable. Papers that treat physical
capital as such a variable like LR are few.
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i. e., each firm cannot appropriate its technology and know-how acquired
by R&D activities, so some or all of them flow out to the rival.3 In
Brander and Spencer (1983), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), and Bulow et
al. (1985), such spillovers are, however, not incorporated: namely, they
implicitly assume no spillovers.
The firms are LMFs, 1 and 2, producing a homogeneous good. The
inverse demand function of a market takes form of p = p(Q), p'(Q) < 0,
where Q = qt + q2 denotes industry output. We assume that each of the
firms has a constant-returns-to-scale production function, q; = F; (L;, kJ.
Production costs are composed of variable costs and fixed costs. Since
F; (Li , ki ) is linear homogeneous in L; and ki , the cost function of firm i is
as follows4:
where Ci is constant, and .f; is fixed costs. Labour input is also a linear
function of output, i. e., Li = 8i qi' where 8; > 0. The demand and produc-
tion functions are more general than those of LR. When making an
investment in R&D to reduce their production costs, especially, marginal
cost Ci' the firm must spend ei (Xi) in order to lower marginal cost by Xi'
where ei(xi) stands for the expenditure (cost) function of R&D and is
convex in Xi' dei(X;)/dXi = e:(x;) > 0, e:'(x;) > 0, and e;(O) = 0. As mentioned
above, there are spillovers in terms of R&D investment, and fii'
3 d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) first incorporate spillovers into a theoretical model
and analyse the effects of them on output and R&D investment.
4 For the detail derivation of the cost function, see Haruna (1996).
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o~ f3i ~ 1, refers to the spillover rate of firm i 's R&D.' In the presence of
the spillover effects firm i's marginal cost is lowered by Xi + f3iXj, i f= j, as a
result of the two firms' R&D. Thus it follows that the cost function is
finally reduced to
(Ci - Xi - f3i Xj )qi +it .
For simplicity we assume in the following discussion that the LMFs are
symmetric: that is, c, = C2 = C, fl =f2 =f, and e,(x,) = e2(x2)'
Let us consider the nonstrategic, simultaneous game. The profits of
LMF i are given by
7ri = [p(Q)-(c -Xi -f3Xj)]q; -e(x;)-f·
The firm chooses output and the level of R&D so as to maximise per-
capita profits (dividends):
V; =~ = [p(Q) - (c - Xi - f3Xj)]q; - e(x;) - f,
L; 8qi
= 1,2.
Then the first-order conditions for maximisation are given by
aVi = [p(Q) - (c -Xi - f3Xj) +p'(Q)q;]- Wi = P'qi2 +e(x;) + f = 0 (3)
~ ~ ~
av;
aXi
- e'(x,)
2.:---':---:"':':" = O.
8q;
(4)
5 There are a lot of empirical researches concerning spillovers among firms and intra-
industries. For example, see Cow and Helpman (1995).
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A simultaneous Cournot-Nash equilibrium is characterised by (3) and
(4): Let the costs of R&D be g(x;) = e(x;) - x;q;. The condition for
minimisation of investment costs is g'(x;) = e'(x;) - qi = 0, which is
equivalent to (4). Since both conditions for maximisation and minimi-
sation are dual, there is no inconsistency in the model unlike LR.
Let us turn to the firm's choice in the strategic two-stage game. The
game should be solved backwardly. Then in the second stage the problem
of the LMF is to choose output so as to maximise per-capita profits, given
max V;
qi
[p(Q)-(c -Xi -,BXj)]q; -e(x;)-!
Oqi
The first-order conditions for maximisation are
8Vi _P'qi2 + e (X;)+!_0
8qi - oqi2 -.
On the other hand, the second-order conditions are
2
8 Vi 2p' + p"q; °
- < .
8q; oq;
(5)
(6)
A strategic Cournot-Nash equilibrium is characterised by conditions (5).
We assume throughout the paper that the equilibrium is interior and
locally stable. For stability it is required that
6 It is assumed that the second-order conditions are satisfied and that the equilibrium
is interior and stable.
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Then the two-stage game has a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
The output reaction function of firm i is given by (5):
(7)
The slope of the reaction curve is obtained by totally differentiating (5):
(8)
where 82 V;/8qj 8Qi = p"/8. This means that if outputs are strategic
substitutes (complements), i. e., 82 VJ8qj 8qi < (» 0, then the curves are
downward (upward)-sloping. With linear demands, the LMF's best
response is obtained, independent of the rival's output, while the PMF's
one is not independent. This is because the strategic characteristics which
the outputs of the LMF and PMF have depend on their ownership
structure. On the other hand, an increase in firm i's investment shifts its
own reaction curve rightwards, but does not the rival's one. This result is
the same as the conventional result (Brander and Spencer, 1983). We note
that spillovers do not have any effect on the investment decision of the
LMF; in other words, it receives no benefit from the rival's investment.
Examine the effects of a change in investment on the outputs.
Differentiating (5) with respect to it and solving the equations yields
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/
2 2 28q; (rx; 8q; )(8 ~ /8qj )
-=- >0
8x; D (9)
8qL _ (rx;/8qn(82~/8q; 8qj)
8x; - D
These results show that an increase in x; causes firm i's output to
increase and firm .i's output to decrease (increase) if their outputs are
strategic substitutes (complements).
Next let us go back to the first stage. Here the LMF chooses the level
of investment so as to maximise per-capita profits. We differentiate V;(x;)
with respect to x; to obtain the first-order conditions:
dV; = 8V; 8q; + 8V; 8qj + 8V; = p'(Q) 8qj = 0, . J- •
I,J,dx; 8q; 8x; 8qj 8x; 8x; 8 8x; (10)
where 8V;/8q; = 0 from (5), and 8V;/8qj = p'(Q)/8 < O. A first-stage
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is derived from (10). For simplicity, we
assume that it is an interior and locally stable equilibrium. We, moreover,
assume throughout this and the next sections that the second-order
conditions for maximisation are satisfied although we do not, particularly,
mention.
Consider the optimal level of R&D investment in the strategic game
and compare with that in the simultaneous game. For comparison, we
must know the sign of the second term on the right-hand side of(IO). The
term is the strategic term which generally appears in nonsimultaneous
games (see Bulow et aI., 1985; Dixit, 1986). It follows from (9) that the
sign of the term is negative or positive according as firm i regards its
output as a strategic substitute or complement for firm .i's output.
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Consequently, when their outputs are strategic substitutes (comple-
ments), it follows that
Taking condition (4) into consideration, we find that as long as outputs
are strategic substitutes (complements), the LMF chooses a higher (lower)
level of R&D than the optimal level, where the costs of R&D are
minimised. We establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1. In an LM duopoly, when making a strategic use of R&D,
the LMFs have incentives to overinvest (underinvest) in R&D provided
that their outputs are strategic substitutes (complements), irrespective of
spillovers.
These results are fundamentally the same as the conventional results
derived by Bulow et al. (1985), and Brander and Spencer (1983). Ifwe look
into the conclusion of the proposition in more detail, we find some
difference between it and the conventional conclusion.7 It is of great
interest that a difference in firm ownership structure seldom has an effect
on its investment behaviour. Moreover, the LMF determines the amount
of R&D, independent of its spillover rate, unlike the PMF's case (Leahy
and Neary, 1997; Haruna, 1998).
7 It is worthy to note that the conditions for outputs to be strategic substitutes and
complements for a PMF and an LMF are a little different. Owing to this, the
conventional conclusion is not perfectly the same as that obtained here.
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IV. The Effect of Strategic Commitment on the Cournot
Mixed Duopoly of a Labour-Managed and a Profit-
Maximising Firms with R&D Spillovers
By replacing one LMF by a PMF, we consider the level of R&D in a
mixed duopoly. The structure of the model except for this replacement is
kept unchanged. Let the LMF be firm 1 and the PMF be firm 2. The
objective ofthe PMF is to maximise profits, which are
11", = [p(Q) - (c - x, - ,8XI) ]q, - e(x,) -f.
We consider second-stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the two-
stage game model. As for the LMF, the first-order and second-order
conditions have already been derived as (5) and (6). On the other hand,
the first-order and second-order conditions for the PMF are given by
&, I
-=p(Q)-(c -x,-,8x\)+p (Q)q, =0
8q,
2
811", I "
--, = 2p +P q, < O.
8q,
(11)
These are the conditions obtained in the conventional analysis. The
equilibrium of the mixed duopoly is characterised by (5) and (11). It is
assumed to be interior and locally stable. The requirement for stability is
where 8'V1/8q,8q\ = (p' + p"q\)/8q\ and 8'11",(8q\8q, = pi + p"q,. The output
reaction function of the LMF is R\(q,), as shown by (7), and that of the
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PMF is R2(ql) = p(Q) - (c - X2 - (3Xl) +p'(Q )q2 from (11). The slope of the
latter's reaction curve depends on the sign of 8\2/8qI8q2 because
a21[2/8q; < 0: namely, if the PMF regards its output as a strategic
substitute (complement) for the LMF's output, then the curve slopes
downwardly (upwardly). We find that, given 0 < p// < - p' /q2' the reaction
curve of the PMF slopes downwardly, but that of the LMF slopes
upwardly. This is because there is a difference between an LMF and a
PMF in terms of the strategic characteristics of outputs. An increase in X2
causes the reaction curve of the PMF to shift rightwards and keeps the
LMF's one constant, while an increase in Xl causes the reaction curves of
both firms to shift rightwards. The strategic effect of investment is a little
different by the type of firm. This difference is caused by the existence of
spillover p: namely, the LMF's investment is beneficial to the PMF, but
the reverse is not the case.
Let us proceed to the decision stage of investment. In the first stage
the first-order conditions for maximisation are
dVj = i aq2 + aVI = 0
dXI 8 aXI aXI
(12)
(13)
where aVI/aql = 87r2/aq2 = 0 from the first-order conditions in the second
stage. Conditions (12) and (13) give us a first-stage Cournot-Nash
equilibrium. Then the two-stage game has a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium. Both (p'/8)(aq2/8xI) and (p'q2)(aql/aX2) on the right-hand,
sides of (12) and (13) are the strategic term. Whether or not the firms
overinvest relies on their signs. Differentiating (12) and (13) with respect
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to XI and X2' respectively, yields
8q2 _ (e'(xI)/8q;)(827r2/8qI8q2) - (3(82Vt/8q;)
8xI - D'
2
8ql = 8 VI18q28ql
8x, D'
(14)
(15)
For example, 8ql18x2 gets zero and positive (negative) for linear and
convex (concave) demands, respectively. Hence the strategic term in (12)
is negative if outputs are not strategic substitutes for the PMF, while it is
of either sign if not so. With no spillovers, the term gets negative
(positive) if they are strategic complements (substitutes). By contrast, the
term in (13) is negative or positive according as outputs are strategic
complements or substitutes for the LMF.
Before going ahead, we examine the level of investment in the
simultaneous game. Then the first-order condition for the LMF is given
by (4), and that for the PMF is given by
(16)
When satisfying (4) and (16), the investments in R&D of the LMF and
PMF are made at the level minimising its costs.
Comparing (12) and (4), and (13) and (16), we find that if 8qj 18x;,
i F j, is positive (negative), then firm i has an incentive to use investment
to a larger (lower) level than that required to minimise its costs. When we
make use of (14) and (15), this result is mentioned as follows. Provided
that outputs are strategic complements for the LMF and PMF, they will
underinvest in R&D, but on the other hand, provided that they are
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strategic substitutes, the PMF will overinvest, but the LMF mayor may
not overinvest: with no spillovers, the latter will overinvest. The results
are summarised as the following proposition:
Proposition 2. In a mixed duopoly with an LMF and a PMF,
(0 provided that outputs are strategic substitutes, the PMF will
overinvest in R&D in the strategic game, and the LMF mayor may not
overinvest, but, with no spillovers, it will overinvest; and
(ii) provided that they are strategic complements, the PMF and LMF
both will underinvest in R&D in the strategic game.
The result as to the PMF is the same as the conventional result (e. g.,
Brander and Spencer, 1983; Bulow et al., 1985), however the result as to
the LMF is in sharp contrast with the latter result and Proposition 1. The
reason for this lies in the existence of spillovers, that is, the investment
behaviour of the LMF is affected by the introduction of the PMF into the
model. We find that, given linear demands, the PMF makes an
overinvestment in R&D, but the LMF makes an optimal investment. The
results of Proposition 2 are unambiguously different from the results of
Leahy and Neary (1997) and Haruna (1998) that whether PMFs
overinvest or underinvest depends crucially on the rates of R&D
spillovers. Moreover, comparing Propositions 1 and 2, we note that in the
absence of spillovers it depends on firm ownership structure (or
organisation) whether they playa role in firms' choices of investment.
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v. Conclusion
It is commonly recognised in the conventional discussions that in
strategic games PMFs will have incentives to use a more or less level of
investment than its efficient level. Although LR have attempted to
examine whether the conventional conclusion is extended to a pure LM
and a mixed duopolies, a duality between the conditions for minimisation
and maximisation with respect to capacity is lost in their model. Owing to
this, their Proposition 1 is invalid. To avoid such a problem, they should
rather use the same method as the conventional one to judge whether
firms overinvest or underinvest: namely, the optimal level of investment
should be derived from the condition for its cost minimisation in a
nonstrategic, simultaneous game. Otherwise, it is difficult to elucidate
whether firms strategically overinvest or underinvest. First of all, as a
prerequisite for comparison, an interior equilibrium must exist in the
simultaneous game. This must be the same with the LM and mixed
duopolies. However, to make matters worse, when we attempt to analyse
the investment behaviour of the duopolies along the conventional way, it
is proved that there is not such an equilibrium in the simultaneous game
based on the LR model, unlike the conventional game model. This leads to
a misfortune result for their model that their Propositions lack validity.
Anyway, their assertions are not established.
Secondly, we have provided alternative duopoly models with R&D
more general than LR, and have demonstrated that the conclusion as to
investment obtained under the LM duopoly is fundamentally the same as
that under the conventional PM duopoly. What is of interest is that the R
& D level of the LMF is chosen, independent of R&D spillovers. This
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obviously contrasts with the conventional result. On the other hand, the
result as to the PMF in the mixed duopoly is the same as the conventional
result, but the result as to the LMF in it is different from that in the LM
duopoly; particularly, the level of the former's investment is obviously
affected by a spillover rate.
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A Note on Capital Commitment and
Cournot Competition with Labour-Managed
and Profit-Maximising Firms
Shoji Haruna
This paper shows that the discussion of Lambertini and Rossini
(1998) as to the strategic investment levels oflabour-managed firms in a
labour-managed (LM) duopoly is misleading. This is due to the fact that
there is no duality between the conditions for maximisation and
minimisation, and what is worse, an equilibrium needed for comparison is
interior when the investment behaviour of the firms is discussed along
the conventional method. We reconsider whether they overinvest or
underinvest in R&D, employing a more general model with R&D
spillovers. It is demonstrated that results obtained in the LM duopoly are
similar to those in a conventional duopoly of profit-maximising firms.
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